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Abstract. R. M. Chisholm interprets Brentano’s theory of intentionality through the lens of two 
theses: the ontological thesis, according to which the intentionality of the mental designates the 
fact that there is an immanent object in the act; and the psychological thesis, according to which 
intentionality consists of the direction of the mental act toward the extra-mental object. In my 
paper I interpret Chisholm’s and Brentano’s theses on intentionality from two perspectives: 
intentionality as the most salient distinguishing feature separating the mental from the physical 
(Chisholm’s ontological thesis), and intentionality as a theory of the way in which mental acts 
with their content are related to extra-mental but theoretically-constructed objects of physics 
(Chisholm’s psychological thesis). Thus, an important issue of my paper is also to show that 
Chisholm’s well-known ontological and psychological theses on Brentanian intentionality rest 
on presuppositions that do not fit the program of Brentanian psychology. 
Keywords: psychology; natural science; intentionality; R. M. Chisholm’s ontological thesis; 
R. M. Chisholm’s psychological thesis. 
Pages 88–89 from Franz Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint 
(1874) are the classical locus of current theories of intentionality. It is here that Brentano 
reintroduced the problem of intentionality into contemporary philosophy, by saying that 
“every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle 
Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object” and by what he “might 
call […] the direction towards an object” and “the relation to a content”1. In the 
 
1 F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Bd. I (Hamburg: Meiner, 1924), ed. by 
O. Kraus, p. 124 f.; F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (London: Routledge, 1995), ed. by 
O. Kraus and L. McAlister, transl. by A. C. Rancurello et al., p. 88 f. (all parenthetical page references are to this 
edition). In this edition the expressions “die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt” and “die Beziehung zum Objekt” were 
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following, I propose an interpretation of Brentano’s notion of intentionality according 
to which the intentionality passage (IP), cited above, can be read through the lens of 
two different theories of intentionality, and that one of these theories performs a very 
important task in his 1874 work. Another important goal of my paper is to show that R. 
M. Chisholm’s well-known ontological and psychological theses on Brentano’s 
intentionality rest on presuppositions that do not fit the program of Brentano’s 
psychology2. 
Before I present these theses, I wish to make the following observation: one of 
the fundamental assumptions of this study is the idea that the object to which the 
mental act has a relation to is, in the first instance, the immanent object3. Thus, 
following Brentano, when I discuss the relation to or the direction towards an object, I 
will be concerned, in the first stage of my analysis, with this immanent object. Only 
after this step, will I analyze, at the level of sensory acts, the relationship between the 
mental act and its immanent object, on the one side, and also the relationship between 
the extra-mental object and the mentally presented immanent one, on the other side. 
This basic idea can also be expressed in the following way: the theory of 
intentionality as presented in the IP is not primarily a theory of the way in which the 
mental acts, together with their immanent objects, are related to the extra-mental 
objects presented by them. It is, rather, first and foremost, a theory about the most 
salient distinguishing feature separating mental phenomena from physical phenomena 
(and not extra-mental objects). For Brentano, the clarification of this aspect plays an 
important role in his program to establish psychology as an empirical science because 
(1) it allows the delimitation of the research domain of psychology, i.e., the world of 
mental phenomena, from the research domain of natural sciences, i.e., the world of 
physical phenomena, and (2) it allows the creation of the necessary framework for 
ordering and classifying the mental phenomena in their three fundamental classes: 
presentations, judgements, and emotional phenomena4.  
 
way in which B. Müller translated the expression “die Beziehung”, and I constantly replace the mentioned 
translations with “relation to a content” and “relation to an object”; see F. Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1982), ed. by R. M. Chisholm and W. Baumgartner; F. Brentano, Descriptive Psychology 
(London: Routledge, 1995), ed. and transl. by B. Müller, p. 23 ff. et passim. In the following, I shall resume my 
explanations on Brentano (see I. Tănăsescu, “The two Theories of Intentionality in Brentano and the Program of 
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint”, in Consciousness and Intentionality. Franz Brentano’s Heritage in 
Philosophy of Mind, ed. by G. Fréchette [Dettelbach: J.H. Roll Verlag, 2015], pp. 211–231) and further develop 
them in order to critically review Chisholm’s ontological and psychological thesis. 
2 R. M. Chisholm, “Intentionality”, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 
ed. by P. Eduard, vol. 4, pp. 201–204; R. M. Chisholm, “Brentano on Descriptive Psychology and the 
Intentional”, in Phenomenology and Existentialism (Baltimore: Hopkins Press, 1967), ed. by E. N. Lee and 
M. H. Mandelbaum, pp. 1–23. 
3 F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1995), pp. 180, 197 f.; F. Brentano, 
Descriptive Psychology (1995), p. 139 f. 
4 I shall not go into the detail about this problem here. I only mention that Brentano believed that 
German Idealism constituted the last phase of philosophical decay in the modern era, and he considered 
himself as a regenerator philosophiae. His goal was to contribute to the inauguration of a new era of philo-
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The above points show that the starting assumption of my paper, namely, that 
mental acts are directed, at a first level of analysis, towards their immanent objects, has 
a strictly methodical nature. This means that the need to establish psychology as an 
empirical science, through the separation of the mental from the physical domain, led 
Brentano to orient himself towards the specific features of the two classes of 
phenomena, both present in consciousness5. In this context, nevertheless, Brentano 
clearly recognizes that the physical phenomenon is a sign of the extra-mental physical 
cause to which it points and which it presents. But he does this without valorizing this 
relation from the perspective of a theory of the distinction between the content or the 
immanent object of the mental act and its extra-mental object, as is the case in 
Twardowski, for example6. 
All this allows me to distinguish two theories of intentionality in Brentano: (1) 
intentionality as a theory of the most salient distinctive feature of the Mental with respect 
to the Physical (IT1) and (2) intentionality as a theory of the relating of the mental acts to 
 
sophical rebirth, an era characterized by the dominance of the theoretical interest and through using a method 
conforming to the nature of phenomena; on this problem, see F. Brentano, Auguste Comte und die positive 
Philosophie (1869), and Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand (1895), in F. Bren-
tano, Die vier Phasen der Philosophie (Leipzig: Meiner, 1926), ed. by O. Kraus, pp. 99–133, and pp. 3–32; 
J. Werle, Franz Brentano und die Zukunft der Philosophie. Studien zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte und Wissen-
schaftssystematik im 19. Jahrhundert (Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi, 1989); K. Hedwig, “Vorwort”, in 
F. Brentano, Geschichte der Philosophie der Neuzeit (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), ed. by K. Hedwig, pp. IX–
XXXIX; I. Tănăsescu, “Empfindung, äußere Wahrnehmung und physisches Phänomen als Gegenstand der 
Naturwissenschaft in Brentanos empirischer Psychologie”, in Revue roumaine de philosophie (2011), no. 1–2: 
103–131; I. Tănăsescu, “The Intentionality of Sensation and the Problem of Classification of Philosophical 
Sciences in Brentano’s empirical Psychology”, in Axiomathes (2017), no. 27: 243–263.  
5 For this reason, P. Simons talks in his “Introduction” to the second English edition of Brentano’s 
Psychology about the methodological phenomenalism adopted by Brentano in this work: see P. Simons, 
“Introduction to the second edition”, in F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1995), p. XVI. 
This idea is also taken over and developed by T. Crane, who emphasizes both the distinction between the 
physical phenomenon and the reality to which it refers, and the fact that physical phenomena constitute the 
object of study of the science of nature: see T. Crane, “Brentano’s Concept of Intentional Inexistence”, in The 
Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2006), ed. by M. Textor, pp. 20–36, 25 ff. 
It must be added that this “phenomenalistic” vision of science (F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical 
Standpoint, 1995, pp. 14, 72) does not focus on the problem of the real or unreal existence of the physical 
phenomenon, but primarily on the correlations between phenomena and on the laws governing these 
correlations (ibid., p. 98 ff.). Brentano, influenced by Comte, had already defined the establishing of the laws of 
succession and co-existence of phenomena as the main task of science, an idea used as such in his 1874 work; 
see on this problem: F. Brentano, Auguste Comte und die positive Philosophie (1869), pp. 105, 111, 114 f.; 
F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1995), p. 99; and I. Tănăsescu, “Empfindung, äußere 
Wahrnehmung und physisches Phänomen als Gegenstand der Naturwissenschaft in Brentanos empirischer 
Psychologie”, in Revue roumaine de philosophie (2011), no. 1–2: 103–131.  
6 Husserl, who explicitly elaborated a theory about that, paid much less attention than Brentano to 
intentionality as a feature separating the mental phenomena from physical phenomena; see Vth Logical 
Investigation, §§ 9–11, and the Appendix “External and internal perception: physical and psychical 
phenomena” in E. Husserl, Logical Investigations (London: Routledge, 2001), 2. vol., ed. by D. Morand, 
transl. by J. N. Findlay. 
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the extra-mental objects presented by the immanent objects (IT2)7. In this context, one of 
the central theses of my paper is the following: although the account of intentionality in 
the 1874 work can be addressed from the perspective of both theories, it still 
fundamentally constitutes an example of IT1. This, however, does not mean that the IT1 
under discussion cannot be understood and approached from the perspective of IT2. By 
contrast, in what follows I shall put forward arguments in favor of the idea that the 1874 
version of the IT1 contains certain elements the clarification and development of which 
could constitute an example of IT2, namely the fact that the immanent object is 
permanently conceived of by Brentano as presenting an extra-mental object. In 1874, 
nonetheless, Brentano does not elaborate on the IT2 involved in his empirical 
psychology, and when he really questioned himself regarding the problem of the object 
to which, in the last instance, the psychical acts are related, after 1901, he offered a 
solution that entirely eliminated immanent objects as objects of primary relation of 
mental acts8. Despite these points, I shall defend, in what follows, the thesis that in the 
IT1 of his 1874 work, a clear distinction is made at the level of the act of sensation 
between the content of the presentation and the extra-mental object presented by it. 
The expressions of Brentanian psychology constituting the language of his IT1 are: 
“the intentional (or maybe mental) inexistence of an object”, “the immanent objectivity 
(Gegenständlichkeit)”, “to exist as an object (objectively) in something”, “to exist 
immanently as an object”, the object is “present (gegenwärtigt)” in the mind, “the mental 
phenomena contain an object intentionally within themselves”, “the relation (die 
Beziehung) to a content”, “the relation to the immanent object”9. 
Unlike these expressions, clearly pleading in favor of IT1, in the 1874 work one 
can hardly find expressions pleading just as clearly in favor of IT2. Rather, expressions 
that can be cited in its support are ambiguous, not least because they can be interpreted as 
just as easily supporting IT1. These expressions are: “the relation to an object (die Bezie-
hung auf ein Objekt)”, the “direction towards an object (which is not to be understood 
here as meaning a thing),” “[…] something appears in consciousness […]”, or “We speak 
of a presentation whenever something appears to us”10. On the ground of these 
expressions, many philosophers within the analytical tradition have read Brentano’s IP as 
a sort of IT2, i.e., as a theory of how consciousness can or refers to non-existent objects11.  
In what follows, I shall present some arguments in support of the idea that in the 
case of Brentano’s distinction between psychical and physical phenomena there is also 
 
7 Both Twardowski’s paper On the Content and Object of Presentations [1894] (On the Content and 
Object of Presentations. A psychological Investigation [The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977], transl. by R. 
Grossmann), and Husserl’s Logical Investigations [1900], offer theories of intentionality in this sense. 
8 F. Brentano, Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen (Hamburg: Meiner, 1974), ed. by F. Mayer-Hillebrand. 
9 F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 1995, pp. 81, 88 f., 197 f. 
10 Ibid., pp. VII, 88, 81, 198.  
11 W. Bechtel, Philosophy of Mind. An Overview for Cognitive Science (Hillsdale: LEA, 1988), 
pp. 40–44; G. Segal, “Intentionality”, in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy (Oxford: 
Oxford U. P., 2007), ed. by F. Jackson and M. Smith, pp. 283–309; J. Kim, Philosophy of Mind (Colorado: 
Westview Press, 2011), pp. 17–27. 
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implied, at the level of sensation, a distinction between its immanent object, i.e., the 
physical phenomenon, and its physical cause as explained through natural science, i.e., 
the extra-mental object for which the immanent object stands. In other words, 
Brentano’s theory of the most salient distinctive feature between the Mental and the 
Physical from 1874 also presupposes a theory on how mental acts of sensation refer to 
their physical causes. In order to prove this point, I shall begin with his program for an 
empirical psychology, and, more precisely, with his classification of sciences. This 
classification is: mathematics, physics, chemistry, physiology, and psychology12. Like 
Comte, who influenced Brentano in this matter to a great extent, Brentano emphasizes 
that each class of phenomena specific to a science is built on the previous class, and it 
makes possible the next one. Unlike Comte, however, Brentano admits a “break” in the 
classification of sciences, since for him only the phenomena of physics, chemistry and 
physiology can be considered as developments on those of the preceding classes. In 
relation to these, our mental phenomena seem to be something completely different. It 
is important to note here that, in my view, Brentano’s IP is conceived to answer the 
question addressed by the following excerpt, and not the question of how 
consciousness refers to non-existing objects, as Chisholm and other scholars have 
supposed. The quote in question is:  
But the result of a more careful comparison and an analysis of all pertinent facts 
certainly seems to us to prove that much more information about physiological 
phenomena is to be expected from chemical phenomena than from physiological 
phenomena about mental phenomena. The difference between physiological 
processes and chemical and physical processes really seems to be only that 
physiological processes are more complex […]. We can hardly say the same thing of 
the concept of life when we apply it to the physiological and psychical realms. On the 
contrary, if we turn our attention from the external world to the inner, we find 
ourselves, as it were, in a new realm. The phenomena are absolutely heterogeneous, 
and even analogies either forsake us completely or take on a very vague and artificial 
character. It was for this very reason that we separated the psychical and physical 
sciences as the main branches of empirical science in our earlier discussion of the 
fundamental divisions of that realm13.  
If we supplement this quote with what Brentano says at the beginning of the 
second book of his Psychology, namely, that “all the data of our consciousness are 
divided in two great classes – the class of physical and the class of mental phenomena”14, 
and also with the statement that “the feature which best characterizes mental phenomena 
is undoubtedly their intentional inexistence”15, then we are led into a wholly different 
direction than that of a IT2, i.e., of a theory of relating the mental acts to the extra-mental 
objects presented by the immanent objects. According to this different direction, 
intentionality is the most salient feature distinguishing the mental from the physical 
 
12 F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1995), p. 23 f. 
13 Ibid., p. 50 f.; my emphasis. 
14 Ibid., p. 77. 
15 Ibid., p. 98. 
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realm, broadly understood as the realm of physical, chemical and physiological 
phenomena as investigated and explained through natural scientific endeavors. The fact 
that physical phenomena are conceived of as content of the psychological acts of 
sensation16 allows me to observe that, through establishing the distinctive features 
separating the two fields, Brentano is distinguishing between two classes of phenomena 
that are both placed in consciousness. The distinction, fundamental for an IT2, between 
the content of the mental act and the extra-mental object for which it stands, is not 
explicitly taken into account here. It is implied, nonetheless, in the way in which 
Brentano conceives of the physical phenomenon. For him, this phenomenon is not only 
the immanent object of the sensory act, but it is, at the same time, a sign of the action of a 
physical cause upon the sense organs17 that is productive of the existence of the 
immanent sensory object. The physical causes are discovered by means of natural 
scientific investigation, that is, through sense observation, hypothesis and laboratory 
experiment. Such physical causes, therefore, consist in processes of molecular vibrations, 
impact and pressure triggered by the physical bodies, vibrations that act on the sensory 
receptors, stimulate the afferent nerves, and produce certain sensations – the seen color, 
the felt warmth, etc.18 These sensory qualities, nevertheless, exist as such only in 
consciousness; they “have only a phenomenal and intentional existence”, and are, for this 
very reason, only signs of their physical causes, but not their accurate images. Thus, the 
clarification of the character of sign of physical phenomenon leads us away from the 
correlation sensory act − physical phenomenon as an immanent object of the act to the 
correlation physical phenomenon − physical cause as an extra-mental object symbolized 
through it19. In this way, it becomes clear how the analysis of the status of the physical 
phenomenon in Brentanian psychology leads from a theory of intentionality as a theory 
of the most salient distinctive feature of the Mental with respect to the Physical (IT1) to a 
theory of intentionality as a theory of the relating of the mental acts to the extra-mental 
objects presented by the immanent objects (IT2). The relations between the two theories 
can be described as follows: the Brentanian IT1 is an incomplete and fragmentary IT2, 
i.e., an IT2 that neglects the relation between the immanent and the extra-mental object 
and that pays close attention to those elements, the mental act and its immanent object, 
which can serve the purpose of distinguishing the Mental from the Physical. Conversely, 
the Brentanian IT2 can be considered as an IT1 fully developed and clarified in the 1874 
work, i.e., up to the elucidation of the relation between the immanent objects of the 
sensory acts, the physical phenomena, and their physical causes. Neither Chisholm’s 
ontological nor psychological theses deal with this aspect of Brentano’s view on 
intentionality. A passage from the Lecture on deductive and inductive logic held by 
Brentano at Würzburg University in 1869/1870 shows what an important part the relation 
between the immanent and the extra-mental object plays for him:  
 
16 Ibid., p. 98 ff. 
17 Ibid., pp. 19, 98 ff. 
18 Ibid., p. 47. 
19 Ibid., pp. 88 f., 19. 
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The name designates in a way the content of a presentation as such, that is, the 
immanent object; in another way it designates that which is presented by the content 
of a presentation. The former is the meaning of the name. The latter is what the 
name names. About this we say the name belongs to it. It is that which is the exterior 
object of the presentation, if it exists. We name by means of the meaning20.  
Here is not the place to go into the details of this quote21. I shall confine myself to 
notice that in this passage, Brentano says the same thing as in his explanations on 
sensation in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, namely that mental acts, be 
they nominal or sensory presentations, refer to extra-mental objects due to their imma-
nent objects. As suggested above, therefore, the famous quote of intentionality was not 
written for the purposes of explaining how our consciousness refers to any extra-mental 
existent or non-existent object, but, first and foremost, in order to emphasize the most 
salient distinguishing feature of the Mental in contrast to the Physical. To put it 
differently, the decisive question of the IP, and generally of Psychology from an Empir-
ical Standpoint, is: What distinguishes a mental phenomenon from a physical phenom-
enon, and not how does a mental phenomenon and its content relate to the extra-mental 
world? 
Let us consider now Chisholm’s two theses on the Brentanian intentionality. His 
ontological thesis is based on the language of the Brentanian IT1: “the intentional 
inexistence”, “the immanent objectivity”, etc. It stresses that there is an immanent 
object to the mental act. This object has a mode of being “that is short of actuality but 
more than nothingness”22. In this way, Chisholm assigns to the immanent object a 
certain ontological consistency that is specific for the late medieval conceptualism. 
This idea, however, plays no part in the Brentanian theory of the immanent object, and 
it is repeatedly rejected in the specialist literature23.  
The second remark is the following. At first sight, Chisholm’s two theses seem to 
refer to the IP24. All the scholars who have discussed his theses agree on that25. Yet, I 
believe that an attentive reading of his papers can lead to a different result. Chisholm’s 
ontological thesis is not only a theory of the intentional, i.e., the immanent object of the 
 
20 Franz Brentano, Logik (Spring, 2011), ed. by R. Rollinger (EL 80.13.018). 
21 See about this I. Tănăsescu, “The two Theories of Intentionality in Brentano ...” (2015), pp. 211–231, 
222 f. 
22 R. M. Chisholm, “Intentionality” (1967), p. 201; see also R. M. Chisholm, “Brentano on Descriptive 
Psychology and the Intentional” (1967), pp. 7–8. 
23 W. Sauer, “Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano”, Grazer Philosophische 
Studien (2006), no. 73: 1–26; G. Fréchette, “Deux concepts d’intentionnalité dans la Psychologie de 
Brentano”, in Revue roumaine de philosophie (2011), no. 1–2: 63–86. 
24 R. M. Chisholm, “Intentionality” (1967), p. 201; R. M. Chisholm, “Brentano on Descriptive 
Psychology and the Intentional” (1967), p. 6.  
25 L. McAlister, “Chisholm and Brentano on Intentionality”, The Philosophy of Brentano (London: 
Duckworth, 1976), ed. by L. McAlister; M. Antonelli, Seiendes, Bewußtsein, Intentionalität im Frühwerk von 
Franz Brentano (Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 2001); W. Sauer, “Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption 
bei Brentano” (2006); G. Fréchette, “Deux concepts d’intentionnalité dans la Psychologie de Brentano”, in 
Revue roumaine de philosophie (2011), no. 1–2: 63–86. 
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act, but also a theory of the relation between this object and the extra-mental object 
presented through it26. Important parts of his explanations on the ontological thesis deal 
with this relation that was considered above as a link between the Brentanian IT1 and 
IT227. But in doing so, Chisholm’s ontological thesis performs an important task of his 
psychological thesis: “reference to an object is what distinguishes the mental […] from 
the physical”, and the object “may exist outside the mind”28. From my standpoint, 
however, it is more suitable to expect an explanation on how the mental act refers to the 
extra-mental object on the basis of the latter psychological thesis than on the basis of the 
ontological thesis because (a) the immanent object does not exist on its own, but only as a 
dependent part of the act29, and (b) the reference to the extra-mental object belongs, in the 
last instance, to the act as a whole and not to its intentional part, the immanent object. In 
other words, we can speak about an immanent object within Brentano’s psychology 
because there is always a mental act that has a relation to it. The relation to the ex-
tra-mental object is, therefore, grounded in the relation to the immanent object, which is 
either a relation of mere presence of the object in consciousness, as in the case of the sen-
sory presentation, or a judicative or emotional intentional relation that does not simply 
contain its object, but which, at the same time, is directed to it: I believe, or I do not be-
lieve that there is life on Mars. As I have said above, the immanent object is conceived of 
by Brentano as presenting an extra-mental object, and for this reason the relation to the 
immanent object is always a relation to the extra-mental object presented through it. Al-
though the clarification of this relation was not an important task of his empirical psy-
chology, Brentano cleared it up at the level of the sensory act in the 1874 work, and at the 
level of the nominal presentation in the Logic lecture from the winter semester 1869/70.  
Against this background, Chisholm’s interpretative decisions become clear: 
(1) Chisholm never pays attention to the fact that, at least until 1901, the mental 
act refers, first and foremost, to the immanent object, and not to the extra-mental 
object, as he argues;  
(2) Chisholm does not notice that there are occurrences in Brentano’s psychology 
where this reference is only a relation of mere presence of an object in consciousness – 
in the sensory presentation, something only appears, or is present in the mental act30; 
but there is no reference of the act to its immanent object that can be considered as a 
direction towards an immanent object31;  
 
26 See his comments on this issue in R. M. Chisholm: “Intentionality” (1967), pp. 201–204, 201 f.; 
“Brentano on Descriptive Psychology and the Intentional” (1967), pp. 11–13. 
27 In this way, Chisholm changes the focus of the Brentanian approach because he analyses the 
correlation immanent object – extra–mental object at the level of presentations of non–existent objects. This 
level, however, is not especially considered in the Brentanian psychology. On the other hand, he neglects 
the problem really dealt with in the Brentanian empirical psychology: the correlation between the sensory 
act – physical phenomenon – physical causes. 
28 R. M. Chisholm, “Intentionality” (1967), p. 201 f. 
29 F. Brentano, Descriptive Psychology (1995), p. 23 f. 
30 F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1995), pp. 81, 198. 
31 I. Tănăsescu, “A problem of the Intentional Relation of Presentation in Brentano’s Empirical 
Psychology”, in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 77 (2015), no. 2: 251–271. 
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(3) Although Chisholm knows very well that the task of the IP is to distinguish 
between the Mental and the Physical, he does not focus on this distinction, but on the 
relation to non-existent objects32;  
(4) Chisholm’s reconstruction of the Brentanian intentionality has more to do with 
Brentano’s late reism than with the program of his empirical psychology. In his late 
reistic time, Brentano maintains that only real things exist and can be presented, and he 
deals, to a great extent, with the distinctive features of the psychical relation with respect 
to other relations. For example, unlike the relation of comparison that occurs between 
two real things: “John is taller than Mary”, the psychical relation requires only the 
existence of the person who thinks; the object that is thought about does not have to 
exist33. Notwithstanding this development, the task of Brentano’s empirical psychology 
was to account for what distinguishes the Mental from the Physical, and not for what 
distinguishes the psychical relation from other relations. As I have pointed out above, 
Brentano’s account is that the mental phenomenon is characterized by a relation to an 
object, which is immanent and not transcendent to the act. This remark is crucial for my 
aim because it shows that there are two versions of the psychological thesis in Brentano’s 
psychology: the early version of the relation to the immanent object and the late, reistic 
version, adopted by Chisholm. According to the latter, the psychical relation is, from the 
very beginning, a relation to an extra-mental object. In his papers on Brentano’s 
intentionality, Chisholm uses only this late version, which he also considered as valid for 
the IP. One main disadvantage of his interpretative decision is that it cannot be further 
distinguished between Brentano’s early and late viewpoint on the psychological thesis, 
and therefore it cannot be deployed to adequately understand or accommodate the 
development of his thought on intentionality34. 
 
32 R. M. Chisholm, “Intentionality” (1967), p. 201; R. M. Chisholm, “Brentano on Descriptive 
Psychology and the Intentional” (1967), pp.  6–7. 
33 F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1995), pp. 211–212. For the late 
Brentano the object thought about is not an immanent object, but always a real thing: see F. Brentano, Die 
Abkehr vom Nichtrealen (Hamburg: Meiner, 1974), ed. by Mayer–Hillebrand. 
34 For linguistic corrections and specialized comments, I am indebted to Alexandru Bejinariu, 
Andreea Eșanu, Cyril McDonnell and Bianca Savu. 
